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Abstract
& It is widely acknowledged that the prefrontal cortex plays a
major role in cognitive control processes. One important
experimental paradigm for investigating such higher order
cognitive control is the task-switching paradigm. This para-
digm investigates the ability to switch flexibly between
different task situations. In this context, it has been found
that participants are able to anticipatorily prepare an
upcoming task. This ability has been assumed to reflect
endogenous cognitive control. However, it is difficult to
isolate task preparation process from task execution using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the present
study, we introduce a new experimental manipulation to
investigate task preparation with fMRI. By manipulating the
number of times a task was prepared, we could demonstrate
that the left inferior frontal junction (IFJ) area (near the
junction of inferior frontal sulcus and inferior precentral
sulcus), the right inferior frontal gyrus, and the right
intraparietal sulcus are involved in task preparation. By
manipulating the cue-task mapping, we could further show
that this activation is not related to cue encoding but to the
updating of the relevant task representation. Based on these
and previous results, we assume that the IFJ area constitutes a
functionally separable division of the lateral prefrontal cortex.
Finally, our data suggest that task preparation does not differ
for switch and repetition trials in paradigms with a high
proportion of switch trials, casting doubt on the assumption
that an independent task set reconfiguration process takes
place in the preparation interval. &
INTRODUCTION
It is widely acknowledged that the prefrontal cortex
plays a major role in the coordination of goal-directed
behavior (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Fuster, 1980; Milner,
1963). One crucial aspect of this coordinative function is
our ability to prepare for specific task situations before
we encounter the actual task (Sudevan & Taylor, 1987).
Imagine, for example, that you are driving down a road
and see a traffic sign signaling that there is a traffic light
around the next corner. You will be able to use this sign
to prepare for the upcoming task without knowing
whether the traffic light will be red or green. This
example suggests that we can anticipatorily adjust to
a relevant task. In the terminology of cognitive psycho-
logy, we are able to prepare the task set that determines
the relevant task rules (Rogers & Monsell, 1995).
Experimentally, task set preparation can be investigat-
ed with a cueing version of the so-called task-switching
paradigm (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Meiran, 1996; Sudevan &
Taylor, 1987). In this paradigm, participants are required
to alternate between two different tasks. Because the task
rules change between the tasks, participants constantly
have to adjust to the relevant task set. By presenting a task
cue in advance, it is possible to temporally dissociate task
preparation from task execution.
In behavioral experiments, it has been demonstrated
that switching between tasks involves cognitive control
processes that go beyond simple task-specific process-
ing. This cognitive control effort is reflected in so-called
switch costs (longer reaction times for switch compared
to repetition trials). When participants are able to
prepare the next task, reaction time decreases and a
reduction of switch costs is observed (Meiran, 1996). It
was initially assumed that the reduction of switch costs
reflects the advanced reconfiguration of the task set
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or the preparation of the
stimulus task set (Meiran, 1996). Recently however,
alternative models have been proposed, which do not
postulate a switch-specific control process to be related
to task preparation (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). While
the precise functional role of task preparation is still a
matter of controversy, a number of neuroimaging stud-
ies have tried to isolate the neuronal mechanisms
involved in task preparation (Luks, Simpson, Feiwell,
& Miller, 2002; Rushworth, Paus, & Sipila, 2001; Kim-
berg, Aguirre, & D’Esposito, 2000; MacDonald, Cohen,
Stenger, & Carter, 2000).
Imaging Studies on Task Preparation
One major problem with using neuroimaging methods
to isolate task preparation from task execution is that theMax Planck Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
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time needed to prepare a task is very short while the
hemodynamic response is relatively slow. This leads to
an overlap of the hemodynamic response for the cue and
target period. Modeling the cue- and target-related pro-
cessing with overlapping BOLD signals and nonorthorg-
onal experimental conditions is possible, but relatively
complicated (Toni, Rushworth, & Passingham, 2001).
Accordingly, some authors have used long preparation
intervals to temporally separate these processes (Luks
et al., 2002; MacDonald et al., 2000). However, this
approach has the disadvantage that working memory in
the sense of maintenance of information comes into play.
Another strategy used to investigate task preparation is
to manipulate task-order predictability (Dreher, Koech-
lin, Ali, & Grafman, 2002; Kimberg et al., 2000; Sohn,
Ursu, Anderson, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). This ap-
proach elaborates on the alternating-runs paradigm
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In this paradigm, the order
of task presentation allows the next task to be pre-
dicted. However, in behavioral studies it was found that
task preparation processes might differ for explicit task
cueing and predictability of task order (Koch, 2004).
Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that empirical
findings on the neuronal basis of task preparation are
relatively heterogeneous. Most studies have found
preparation-related activation in the prefrontal cortex
(Dreher et al., 2002; Luks et al., 2002; MacDonald et al.,
2000; Sohn et al., 2000). However, these activations
spread over the whole prefrontal cortex. Furthermore,
some studies have found a difference between switch
and repetition trials in the preparation phase (Kimberg
et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000) whereas others have not
(Luks et al., 2002), casting doubt on the existence of a
task reconfiguration process. We have recently chosen
a different approach to isolate task preparation from
task execution (Brass & von Cramon, 2002). Using trials
in which only a task cue but no task was presented, we
were able to dissociate cue- and target-related process-
ing, without confounding working memory processes.
When compared to low-level baseline, activation was
found in the vicinity of the posterior extent of the
inferior frontal sulcus at the junction with the inferior
precentral sulcus. We termed this area the inferior
frontal junction area (IFJ). Medial frontal activation
was found in the pre-SMA. Although this study suc-
ceeded in dissociating cue- and target-related brain
activation, it left two fundamental questions open.
First, our study, like others, did not show any switch-
specific differences in the preparation phase, suggesting
that there might not be a switch-specific preparation
process (Ruge et al., submitted). However, if task prep-
aration does not differ for switch and repetition trials,
the switch manipulation is not appropriate for identify-
ing the cortical regions involved in task preparation.
Therefore, one aim of the present study was to intro-
duce an experimental paradigm that manipulates task
preparation independently from trial transition. Second,
previous experiments on explicit task cueing did not
address the question of whether the activation in the
frontal cortex reflects the coding of the cue or the
updating of the relevant task set. To address these two
questions, we devised a new paradigm that manipulated
the number of times a task was prepared as well as the
cue-task mapping.
A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging-Related
Approach to Investigating Task Preparation
The rationale behind this paradigm was to use the
strength of neuroimaging methods to decompose cog-
nitive processes. In contrast to reaction time research,
no response is needed to investigate a mental process.
In our paradigm, participants were given two task cues
separated by a preparation interval before the target
was presented (Figure 1). These task cues indicated
either the same or a different task. In addition, catch
trials were presented in which the target appeared after
the first cue. These catch trials ensured that partici-
pants paid attention to the first cue. Furthermore, this
single-cue condition could be used to investigate the
trial transition effect. For the double-cue conditions, we
predicted that if both cues indicate the same task,
participants only prepare once, whereas if the second
cue indicates a different task they should prepare
twice. The second experimental manipulation was re-
lated to the question of which specific processes are
reflected by cue-related activation. By assigning two
cues to each task, we can compare a switch of both
cues without a switch of cue meaning (two differ-
ent cues that indicate the same task) with a switch of
cues and cue meaning (two cues that indicate different
tasks) (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003;
Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller, & Wagner, 2003). While the
coding of the cue is required in both conditions,
participants are only required to prepare the task twice
in the condition in which the cue meaning change.
In addition to trial type, we manipulated the cue–target
interval (CTI). In the short CTI, participants were
required to respond 60 msec after the relevant cue
(the second cue in the three double-cue conditions
and the first cue in the single-cue condition), while
they had 700 msec to prepare in the long CTI condi-
tion. The CTI manipulation was introduced as an
additional manipulation check to ensure that the
first cue was indeed processed. If the double-cue
conditions differ regarding the processes involved, we
can expect a reaction time difference in the short CTI
condition, but not in the long CTI condition. Hence,
the experimental design consisted of the factors
trial type (cue repetition, cue switch, meaning switch)
and CTI (short, long). The single-cue condition
was analyzed separately because of the different trial
structure.
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RESULTS
Behavioral Data
The response time data were analyzed using a repeated
measurement ANOVA with the factors trial type and CTI
(Figure 2A). A main effect of trial type, F(2,26) = 25,
p< .01, and CTI, F(1,13) = 283, p< .01, was found. Most
interestingly, the interaction was also significant,
F(2,26) = 7, p < .01. In the short CTI condition, partic-
ipants were significantly faster when the cuewas repeated
than when it was switched, t(13) = 3.7, p < .01. Further-
more, a significant reaction time difference was found
between the meaning-switch and the cue-switch condi-
tion, t(13) = 3.5, p < .01). These data suggest that
participants indeed used the first cue to prepare the task.
Otherwise, no reaction time difference would have been
expected between the three types of trials. In the long CTI
condition, the only significant reaction time difference
was found between the meaning-switch condition and
the other conditions, t(13) = 2.3, p < .05 (Figure 2B).
This result indicates that even in the long CTI, partic-
ipants are not able to completely overrule the task set
activation caused by the first cue.
Figure 1. Trial structure and exact experimental timing. In the three double-cue conditions, two task cues were presented before the target was
displayed. In the single-cue condition, the target was presented after the first cue. The lower part of the figure displays the cue-task mapping.
Two different cues were assigned to each task.
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The comparison of short and long CTI in the single-
cue condition revealed the expected strong preparation
effect of about 130 msec, t(13) = 12.0, p < .01, also
indicating that participants used the first cue to prepare
the task. Furthermore, we computed the trial-transition
effects for the single-cue condition (Figure 2C and D).
This analysis was carried out by comparing the last cue
in trial n  1 with the cue in trial n. Equivalent to the
within-trial manipulation one can distinguish three types
of between-trial transitions: a switch in cue meaning, a
cue switch, and a cue repetition. A main effect for
transition type was found, F(2,12) = 31,88, p < .01.
Participants were faster when the cue in trial n  1 was
identical to the cue in trial n compared to the condition
in which the cue switched, t(13) = 5.6, p < .01.
Furthermore, subjects were faster when the cue but
not the cue-meaning changed, t(13) = 2.8, p < .05.
No interaction of CTI and transition type was found.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Data
For the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
analysis, we pooled both CTI conditions, since the CTI
manipulation was only introduced as a manipulation
check for the first cue and we know from previous
experiments (Brass & von Cramon, 2002) that it has
no effect on the preparation-related activation. The
crucial contrast was the difference between the mean-
ing-switch condition and the cue-switch condition (see
Figure 3 and Table 1). Since both conditions involve a
cue-switch, this contrast should indicate cortical regions
that are related to the updating of the relevant task set,
Figure 2. (A) Reaction time as a function of cue-transition in the short CTI condition (double-cue conditions). (B) Reaction time as a function of
cue transition in the long CTI condition (double-cue conditions). (C) Reaction time as a function of trial transition in the short CTI (single-cue
conditions). (D) Reaction time as a function of trial transition in the long CTI (single-cue conditions).
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but not to the coding of the cue. In accordance with our
hypothesis, this contrast yielded strong activation in the
left IFJ. This activation was only a few millimeters
anterior to the fronto-lateral activation we found in
our previous study on task preparation (Brass & von
Cramon, 2002). In addition, activation was found in the
right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Finally, the horizontal
branch of the right intraparietal sulcus (IPS) was found
to be activated. No significant activation was found in
the pre-SMA. To check whether the pre-SMA was acti-
vated when compared to baseline, we carried out a
signal change analysis with the mean coordinate (x = 1,
y= 5, z= 53) from Brass and von Cramon (2002), which
indicated cue-related activation (Figure 4, last panel).
Interestingly, a significant activation of the pre-SMA was
found in all three conditions, while no activation differ-
ence was found between the meaning-switch and the
cue-switch condition, t(13) = .91, p = .37. However, the
cue-repeat condition was significantly less activated,
t(13) = 2.6, p < .05.
The second relevant contrast was related to the
comparison of the cue-switch condition and the cue-
Figure 3. Cortical activation for the contrast of meaning switch versus cue switch with a z value >3.1.
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repetition condition. This contrast should indicate
whether the prefrontal cortex was also involved when
the cue, but not the cue-meaning, changed. No signifi-
cant activation was found with the z threshold of 3.1. To
investigate whether there might be some subthreshold
activation in the prefrontal cortex, we lowered the z
threshold to 2.6. However, even with this lower thresh-
old, no prefrontal areas were found to be activated.
Rather, activation was found in the lateral premotor
cortex, the inferior temporal gyrus, and the fusiform
gyrus (Table 2). This activation indicated the encoding
of the cue information.
The signal changes indicate that the IFJ, the right
IFG, and the IPS were activated in all three experimen-
tal conditions when compared to baseline (Figure 4).
However, it was only when the cue-meaning changed
that this activation increased compared to the cue-
repetition condition, t(13) = 4.0, p < .01. No significant
difference was found for the comparison of the cue-
switch and cue-repetition conditions, t(13) = .83,
p = .41. Finally, we wanted to investigate whether the
cortical areas that showed a significant activation differ-
ence in the meaning-switch versus cue-switch contrast
were also found to be activated when we compare
switch versus repeat trials in the single-cue condition.
We restricted the trial transition analysis to the single-
cue condition, because trial transition is not unambig-
uously defined for all double-cue conditions. From
previous research, we know that the transition effect
is sensitive to the CTI manipulation (Ruge et al.,
submitted). Therefore, we analyzed the transition effect
Figure 4. Signal change diagrams for the three most activated cortical areas in the meaning-switch versus cue-switch contrast. The signal changes
of the pre-SMA were computed in the coordinate (x = 1, y = 5, z = 53) taken from Brass and von Cramon (2002).
Table 1. Cortical Activation for the Comparison of Meaning
Switch versus Cue Switch with a z > 3.1 and a Minimum
Volume Size of 225 mm3 (Five Adjacent Voxels)
Size (mm3) z Max Laterality Talairach Coordinates
IFJ 976 4.13 Left 37, 5, 32
IFG 770 3.17 Right 55, 20, 18
IFS 935 4.01 Right 35, 58, 44
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for both CTI conditions separately. Because of the small
trial number, we restricted the analysis to the compar-
ison of switch and repetition trials without further
distinguishing between the cue-switch and the cue-
repetition condition. Furthermore, we again lowered
the z threshold to 2.6 since we had a clear a priori
hypothesis about the relevant brain areas. In accord-
ance with previous results, a switch-specific activation
was found for the left IFJ, the pre-SMA, and the dorsal
premotor cortex in the short CTI condition, but not in
the long CTI condition (Table 3).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was twofold. First, we
wanted to introduce an experimental manipulation that
varied the task preparation processes independently
from trial transition. Second, we wanted to dissociate
cortical regions related to the encoding of the cue from
those related to the updating of the task set. The
findings of the present study are clear-cut in both
respects. The behavioral data demonstrate that task
preparation can be manipulated within an experimental
trial. In the short CTI condition, participants were fastest
when both the cue and the cue meaning were repeated.
When the cue changed but the cue meaning was iden-
tical, there was an increase in reaction time. Most
importantly, reaction times were slowest when both
the cue and the cue meaning changed. These data
strongly suggest that two different cognitive processes
can be dissociated. This assumption is further supported
by the analysis of the trial-transition effects, which
showed a similar result. One process is related to cue
encoding. When the same cue was presented twice
participants only had to code it once, whereas when
the cue switched, they had to code the cue twice. In the
fMRI data, this process was reflected in the activation of
the fusiform gyrus/inferior temporal cortex and the
lateral premotor cortex. These activation foci were in
accordance with existing literature. The fusiform gyrus is
known to be related to the visual processing of objects
(Rao, Zhou, Zhou, Fan, & Chen, 2003; Kanwisher,
Woods, Iacoboni, & Mazziotta, 1997). Furthermore, a
recent study by Schumacher and D’Esposito (2002)
reported a dissociation of extrastriate visual areas and
a fronto-parietal network related to stimulus encoding
and response selection. The ventral premotor cortex has
been shown to be involved in the sensory processing of
objects (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002). We assume
that the premotor cortex activation reflects the prag-
matic features of the attended cue (Schubotz & von
Cramon, 2002; Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti,
2000).
More importantly, the reaction time difference be-
tween the cue-switch and meaning-switch condition
indicated that the processing of cue meaning also led
to a significant reaction time increase. This experimental
variation was related to the IFJ, the right IFG, and the
IPS. While the activation in the left IFJ and the right IPS
replicate our previous findings, which suggest that these
regions are involved in task preparation, the right IFG
was not found to be activated in our previous study on
task preparation (Brass & von Cramon, 2002).
In the following paragraphs, we will discuss the
functional mechanisms that might be behind the func-
tional role of these activation.
Task Preparation: What Does It Mean?
The present findings extend the results of our previous
study (Brass & von Cramon, 2002), which could dem-
onstrate cue-related activation in the prefrontal cortex
Table 2. Cortical Activation for the Comparison of Cue Switch versus Cue Repetition Trials with a z > 2.6 and a Minimum Volume
Size of 225 mm3 (Five Adjacent Voxels)
Size (mm3) z Max Laterality Talairach Coordinates
Lateral premotor cortex 371 3.55 Left 40, 4, 47
Fusiform gyrus/inferior temporal gyrus 439 3.13 Right 49, 55, 9
Fusiform gyrus/inferior temporal gyrus 428 3.52 Left 49, 58, 9
Fusiform gyrus 655 3.55 Right 32, 79, 3
Table 3. Cortical Activation for the Contrast of Switch and Repetition Trials in the Short CTI of the Single Cue Condition with a
z > 2.6 and a Minimum Volume Size of 225 mm3 (Five Adjacent Voxels)
Size (mm3) z Max Laterality Talairach Coordinates
Pre-SMA 1468 3.96 Left 5, 2, 50
Lateral premotor cortex 725 3.66 Left 23, 10, 50
Inferior frontal junction 761 3.58 Left 37, 8, 35
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but could not decide whether this activation was related
to the encoding of the cue or to the updating of the
task set. The present data clearly indicate prefrontal
involvement in task preparation processes that go be-
yond simple cue encoding. More specifically, we assume
that the left IFJ is involved in the processing of the
relevant task set. Rubinstein, Meyer, and Evans (2001)
recently dissociated two subcomponents related to task
switching, namely, goal shifting and rule activation.
While goal shifting is related to the activation of a gene-
ral task representation, the rule activation process is re-
sponsible for activating task-specific stimulus–response
rules. Goschke (2000) proposed a concept that is similar
to the goal-shifting component. He argued that task
preparation mainly requires the retrieval of the relevant
task representation. Based on the present experiment,
we cannot dissociate the updating of the general task
representation, from the activation of specific stimulus–
response rules. By showing that prefrontal neurons
represent abstract task rules (Wallis, Anderson, & Miller,
2001), recent neurophysiological data support the as-
sumption that the lateral prefrontal cortex is involved in
the processing of task representations. However, neu-
rophysiological findings could also show that the lateral
prefrontal cortex is involved in the processing of a
specific kind of stimulus–response rules, so-called arbi-
trary motor mappings (Wise & Murray, 2000; Rushworth
& Owen, 1998). In arbitrary motor mappings, the appli-
cation of an abstract rule is required to guide behavior.
Recently, Bunge et al. (2003) directly compared the
processing of arbitrary motor mappings and abstract
task rules and found stronger activation in a region
close to the IFJ for the abstract task representation
compared to the arbitrary motor mapping.
In neuropsychology, the idea that the prefrontal
cortex is involved in the processing of general task
representations (here called goals) was elaborated by
Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, and Freer (1996).
They assumed that a major problem of prefrontal pa-
tients is what they called goal neglect. Patients with goal
neglect have problems representing and flexibly switch-
ing between different task goals. Goschke (2000) as-
sumed that the updating of general task representations
mainly consists in verbalizing such representations. In-
terestingly, goal neglect can be dissociated from a failure
to verbalize the instruction. Prefrontal patients are often
able to report what they should do, but they neverthe-
less not take the necessary action. This finding suggests
that the updating of a task representation goes beyond
a simple verbalization strategy.
Regarding the existing imaging literature, the present
results are consistent with a number of task-switching
studies (Konishi et al., 2002; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert,
Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000; Pollmann, Dove, von
Cramon, & Wiggins, 2000) and Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (WCST) studies (Nakahara, Hayashi, Konishi, &
Miyashita, 2002; Monchi, Petrides, Petre, Worsley, &
Dagher, 2001; Nagahama et al., 2001), which have
demonstrated the role of the IFJ in cognitive control
processes. However, as suggested above, we think that
the present study further clarifies the functional role of
this cortical region. While more anterior prefrontal
regions in the mid-dorsolateral and ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortex might be related to working memory in
the sense of maintenance and manipulation of working
memory content (Henson & Fletcher, 2002; D’Esposito
et al., 1998), the IFJ is involved in context-related
updating of the general task representation. In this
sense, the IFJ constitutes a third, functionally distinct
region in the lateral prefrontal cortex. From the neuro-
anatomical perspective, it makes perfect sense that the
IFJ should have a separate role. Based on its cyto-
architectonic structure, Petrides and Pandya (1999) sep-
arated the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex from the
posterior prefrontal cortex. While the mid-dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex is composed of Brodmann’s areas (BA)
46 and 9/46, the IFJ is cytoarchitectonically located at
the junction of prefrontal area 8Av, premotor area 6, and
the premotor/prefrontal transition cortex BA 44. This
makes it perfectly suited to integrate premotor, prefron-
tal, and verbal information.
Parietal Contributions to Cognitive Control
The discussion thus far has focused on the role of the
left IFJ in task preparation. However, the parietal cortex
showed a very similar activational pattern. Furthermore,
we found exactly the same IPS activation in our previous
study on task preparation (Brass & von Cramon, 2002).
This raises the question as to the functional role of
the parietal cortex in cognitive control. Regarding the
interaction of prefrontal and parietal cortex, it has been
suggested that the parietal cortex receives biasing signals
from the prefrontal cortex that influence task-specific
processing (Tomita, Ohbayashi, Nakahara, Hasegawa, &
Mijashita, 1999). Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, and
Gabrieli (2002) recently dissociated different functional
roles of prefrontal and parietal cortex in an interference
paradigm. While the prefrontal cortex was involved in
the selection of the relevant response, the parietal
cortex was associated with the representation of candi-
date responses. Using a task-switching paradigm, Rush-
worth et al. (2001) found an association of the medial
IPS with the motor attention required to initiate inten-
tional switches between visuomotor transformation
rules. More generally, Corbetta and Shulman (2002)
argued that parts of the IPS are involved in the selection
of stimulus and response. Based on these results, it is
reasonable to postulate a functional dissociation of the
parietal and the prefrontal cortex in task preparation.
While the IFJ is involved in the updating of the general
task representation, the parietal cortex might provide
the relevant stimulus–response associations that are
needed to execute the task.
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Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus and the Inhibition of
Task Representations
The right IFG was the only cortical region that was not
found to be related to task preparation in our previous
study (Brass & von Cramon, 2002). Therefore, we
assume that this activation is not related to task prep-
aration per se, but might result from two different task
sets competing in working memory when the cue
meaning changes. The representation of the first cue
has to be overwritten to establish the task representa-
tion of the second cue. Interestingly, an activation of
the right IFG was also found in a task-switching study
that manipulated foreknowledge (Sohn et al., 2000).
Here, the activation was stronger in switch than in
repetition trials. Compared to a cueing paradigm in
which the task instruction is provided before each trial,
in the study conducted by Sohn et al. (2000), the order
of task presentation indicated which task to execute. In
switch trials, the task instruction for trial n has to be
retrieved while trial n  1 is still active in working
memory. The right IFG might be involved in the
selection of the second task set when interference
occurs from the first task set. This would be consistent
with the role of the IFG in selective memory retrieval
(for an overview, see Henson & Fletcher, 2002). It is
important to note that we expect such interference
effects only if two task sets have to be held in a
preparatory state. As soon as the participant has exe-
cuted one task, the respective task set will be discarded
from working memory. This is why such interference
effects usually do not occur for the transition between
trials (see below).
Pre-SMA and Task Preparation
Another puzzling aspect of the present results was the
lack of significant activation in the pre-SMA for the
whole brain analysis. In previous studies, the pre-SMA
has been found to be involved in task switching (Rush-
worth, Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 2001; Dove et al., 2000).
Furthermore, it has been shown that the pre-SMA is
involved in cue-related processing (Brass & von Cramon,
2002; Luks et al., 2002). Based on these results, we
expected to find an activation difference for the mean-
ing-switch versus cue-switch contrast. However, such an
effect was not found. Even if the signal change analysis
indicated that the pre-SMA was significantly activated in
all three conditions, a significant decrease in activation
was only found in the cue repetition condition. In other
words, this cortical region is only sensitive to a change in
the cue but not in the cue meaning. In contrast to our
previous assumption (Brass & von Cramon, 2002), the
present data indicate that the pre-SMA is not related to
task-specific preparation. Rather, we would suggest that
the pre-SMA activation reflects some kind of general
preparedness in situations in which the relevant re-
sponses are uncertain. This would be consistent with
the role of the pre-SMA in response competition (Ga-
ravan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002; Ullsperger &
von Cramon, 2001). Another interpretation of the pre-
SMA might be that this region is sensitive to a cue
change because a cue change might indicate a change
of behavioral strategy.
Task Preparation and Task Set Reconfiguration
Unlike most other studies, we have identified the corti-
cal regions that are related to task preparation by
manipulating the number of times a task was prepared
and not by comparing switch and repetition trials. The
question arises of whether our manipulation activated
the same prefrontal regions as the manipulation of trial
transition. When analyzing the trial transition effect in
the single-cue condition, we found a significant switch
effect in the IFJ and the pre-SMA in the short CTI
condition, whereas no prefrontal area was activated in
the long CTI condition. These data suggest that the left
IFJ is sensitive to both the manipulation of trial transi-
tion and the manipulation of task preparation. Based on
these results, one might argue that the IFJ is involved in
anticipatory task set reconfiguration. However, such an
interpretation is not consistent with the finding that this
region was only activated in the short CTI condition and
not in the long CTI condition. If the activation difference
between switch and repetition trials takes place in the
preparation phase, we would not expect any difference
of the switch effect between the long and short CTI
condition. Based on these data and previous findings of
no switch-specific activation difference in the prepara-
tion phase (Brass & von Cramon, 2002; Luks et al.,
2002), we assume that the IFJ is involved in task
preparation, but that this task preparation process does
not differ for switch and repetition trials in the prepara-
tion phase. In an experimental context in which there is
an equal likelihood of switch and repetition trials, which
is indeed the case in most task switching studies,
participants tend to prepare the task in each trial.
Therefore, prefrontal brain regions do not show a
consistent switching effect. Interestingly, studies on
the WCST consistently found posterior prefrontal acti-
vation (Nakahara et al., 2002; Monchi et al., 2001;
Nagahama et al., 2001). Most of these studies use a
simplified version of the WCST that is very similar to a
task-switching paradigm. In WCST studies, however, the
likelihood of switch trials is usually much smaller than
50%. Therefore, subjects in WCST paradigms are less
required to prepare the task set in repetition trials,
leading to stronger switch effects.
But still the question of why we found a switch effect
in the short CTI condition but not in the long CTI
remains open. Based on another study, in which we
directly addressed this question, Ruge et al. (submitted)
assumed that the switch effect in the short CTI condition
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does not reflect task set reconfiguration but results from
the higher control effort required when the task is
presented before the task representation is specified.
In switch trials, interference arises because the experi-
mental stimulus activates the previous task set (Allport,
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994) and the task representation has to
be strengthened to overcome this task incongruent
activation. Such an interpretation would suggest that
the updating of task representations can be carried out
anticipatorily to prepare the task set but also after
stimulus presentation to overcome task set inertia.
Conclusions
In the present experiment, we dissociated two cognitive
components related to the processing of task cues. One
component, which is located in the fusiform gyrus and
the dorsal premotor cortex, is related to cue encoding.
The second component is located in the left IFJ, the
right IFG, and the IPS. Based on this study and a
previous study, we assume that the left IFJ is responsible
for activating a general task representation, whereas the
IPS might be involved in providing the relevant stimu-
lus–response associations. The right IFG seems to be
related to the selective retrieval of the relevant task set
when interference arises from a nonrelevant task set.
The pre-SMA, which was previously assumed to be
related to task preparation, showed no specific response
to the manipulation of cue meaning, indicating that it is
involved in a task-unspecific process of general pre-
paredness. Furthermore, we assume that in a task-
switching paradigm with an equal likelihood of switch
and repetition trials, the updating of the task represen-
tation takes place in each experimental trial, regardless
of whether the trial is a switch or repeat trial. Therefore,
it is difficult to identify preparation-related activation by
manipulating trial transition. Finally, our data demon-
strate how the specific advantages of neuroimaging
(manipulating mental processes independently from
the response) can contribute to the understanding of
cognitive processes.
METHODS
Experimental Design
In this study, we used a modified version of the para-
digm introduced by Sudevan and Taylor (1987). Digits
between 20 and 40 (except 30) were presented on the
computer screen. Participants had to execute two tasks:
judging whether a digit was smaller or greater than 30
(magnitude task) and judging whether the digit was odd
or even (parity task). Which task they had to execute
was signaled by a task cue presented as a frame sur-
rounding the digit. In the double-cue conditions, partic-
ipants received two task cues, before the actual task was
presented. These task cues could indicate the same or a
different task. The trial length was 6 sec. Trials started
with a variable oversampling interval of 0, 500, 1000, or
1500 msec to obtain a temporal resolution of 500 msec.
The experimental trial began with a fixation cross that
was presented for 200 msec. The first task cue was then
presented for 100 msec. Before the presentation of the
second cue, a fixed intercue interval of 700 msec
was inserted. After the second cue and a CTI of 60 or
700 msec, the target was presented for 400 msec.
Participants had 2000 msec to respond to the target.
After the response window, a feedback was displayed
for 200 msec. In single-cue trials, the task was presented
60 or 700 msec after the first cue. Two different task cues
were assigned to each task (triangle and diamond to the
parity task and square and inverted triangle to the
magnitude task). This resulted in three double-cue
conditions: a condition in which both the cue and the
cue meaning were repeated (cue repetition condition), a
condition in which the cue switched, but both cues
indicated the same task (cue-switch condition) and a
condition in which the cue switched to indicate the
other task (meaning-switch condition).
The experiment consisted of two blocks, with 192
trials each. One hundred ninety-two double-cue trials
(64 cue repetition/64 cue switch/64 meaning switch)
were randomly intermixed with 128 single-cue trials
and 64 null events.
Participants
Fourteen participants (8 women and 6 men) who gave
informed consent participated in the present study. All
participants (mean age: 24.4 years, standard deviation:
1.9) were right-handed as assessed by a German adap-
tation of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Old-
field, 1971) and had no neurological abnormalities.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Analysis
The experiment was carried out on a 3-T scanner
(Medspec 30/100, Bruker, Ettlingen). Twenty axial slices
(19.2 cm FOV, 64  64 matrix, 4 mm thickness, 1 mm
spacing), parallel to the AC–PC plane, and covering the
whole brain, were acquired using a single shot, gradient-
recalled EPI sequence (TR 2000 msec, TE 30 msec, 90
flip angle). Prior to the functional runs, 20 corre-
sponding anatomical MDEFT slices and 20 EPI-T1 slices
were acquired. Stimuli were presented using a head-
mounted display with a resolution of 1024  768 and a
refresh rate of 60 Hz.
Analysis of fMRI data was performed using the LIPSIA
software package (Lohmann et al., 2001). First, func-
tional data were corrected for movement artifacts. The
temporal offset between the slices acquired in one scan
were then corrected using a sync interpolation algo-
rithm. Data were filtered using a spatial Gaussian filter
with sigma = 1.0. A temporal highpass filter with a cutoff
frequency of 1/100 Hz was used for baseline correction
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of the signal. In addition, a global scaling was carried
out. All functional data sets were individually registered
into 3-D space using the participants’ individual high-
resolution anatomical images. This 3-D reference data
set was acquired for each participant during a previous
scanning session. The 2-D anatomical MDEFT slices,
geometrically aligned with the functional slices, were
used to compute a transformation matrix containing
rotational and translational parameter, which register
the anatomical slices with the 3-D reference T1 data
set. These transformation matrices were normalized to
the standard Talairach brain size (Talairach & Tournoux,
1988) by linear scaling and finally applied to the individ-
ual functional data. The statistical evaluation was carried
out using the general linear model for serially autocor-
related observations (Friston et al., 1995). The design
matrix for event-related analysis was created using a
model of the hemodynamic response with a variable
delay. The model equation was convolved with a Gauss-
ian kernel with a dispersion of 4-sec full width half
maximum. Contrast maps were generated for each
participant. As the individual functional datasets were
all aligned to the same stereotactic reference space, a
group analysis was then performed. A one-sample t test
of contrast maps across participants (random effects
model) was computed to indicate whether observed
differences between conditions were significantly differ-
ent from zero. Subsequently, t values were transformed
into z scores. To protect against false positive activa-
tions, only regions with a z score higher than 3.1 (for
some contrasts, z > 2.6 was chosen, as described in the
Results section) and a minimum volume size of five
adjacent voxels were reported.
To compute the signal change, we determined the
most activated voxel of the relevant contrast in the
mean z map. From this voxel, we extracted the time
course of the signal for each participant. We then
subtracted the time course of the null event from
the time course of the relevant conditions to attenuate
the overlap of the BOLD response. We determined the
percent signal change to be the largest value in the time
window between 4 and 6 sec after cue presentation.
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